The Marine Corps is developing a new command and control (C2) system in support of their newly emerging warfighting doctrine, "Operational Maneuver from the Sea" (OMFTS). The OMFTS environment differs from the traditional amphibious operational concept in its fast tempo operations that exploit enemy vulnerabilities via direct movement of forces from ship to shore.
THE FUTURE OF MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND CONTROL
The Marine Corps command and control (C2) system is undergoing great change in preparation for the Corps' new amphibious concept, Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS).
Increasingly, the security of the U.S. is tied to a global economic community that is predominantly located in the littoral regions of the world. Threats to the global economy are in turn threats to U.S. security. OMFTS answers the call for a full spectrum of military power projection capability for the security of U. S. interests in the littorals. The purpose of this paper is to discuss and recommend changes to the Corps' C2 system that are essential to the success of OMFTS.
The Corps' concept of OMFTS is a future Naval Service -Navy and Marine Corps -capability derived from the naval strategic avenue of friendly movement that is simultaneously a barrier to the enemy and a means of avoiding disadvantageous engagements. 4 OMFTS characteristics of a decentralized battlefield, fast tempo operations from over the horizon, and simultaneous engagements up to 350 kilometers inland will make new demands on naval manpower and system capabilities.
C2, often thought of as a single element is actually two separate processes. Subtle in their differences, command is the authority and responsibility to give direction to and be responsible for the actions of others. Control is the ability to influence the outcome of individual or group actions. In the military, command and then control go together as hand and glove.
Unique to the military is command and then control of large numbers of people possibly displaced over great distances, sometimes requiring near instantaneous decisions with life or death consequences. Should we forget that command and then control are two very different functions we lose the real meaning of C2 as a military function. When discussing C2 we are addressing a process that includes the separate elements of both command and control. The C2 process is the foundation, the very bedrock, on which all success for OMFTS depends.
COMMAND AND CONTROL BACKGROND
C2 depends on the complex interrelationship of four elements: people, doctrine, training, and computer hardware/software (HW/SW) to include facilities that make up the C2 system. The C2 system allows for the continuous cycle of information whereby the commander directs forces, receives information back from the force, and then makes adjustments to the forces until mission accomplishment. 5 The Marine Corps is investing now in plans and programs that will ensure the C2 functionality required of tomorrow's Corps. Even though information technology (IT) is the enabling factor for the C2 revolution, people will always be the dominant factor of the system. The people of the Corps have a rich history of innovation to include: the precise utilization of naval gunfire in support of landing forces, amphibious doctrine, bombing in close support of ground forces, tactical employment of helicopters in the ship-to-shore movement, all-weather close air support, and expeditionary airfields. 6 Marines will continue to be innovators, they will develop and incorporate new C2 doctrine, new training standards, and utilize new HW/SW technologies that will change C2 as we know it today.
C2 in essence is about making and acting on decisions faster than the opposition. This process can be described via a model called the, observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop.
The OODA loop describes how when engaged in conflict, we first observe the situation. After observing the situation we orient to it -we make certain estimates, assumptions, analysis, and judgments. Based on this orientation we decide what to do.
Finally the decision is put into action. 7 This decision process, basic to all confrontation, may look simple, but as is often the case "the devil is in the details".
Human conflict always has and always will incorporate, in some form and to varying degrees, the element of C2. It is not the intent of this paper to over sell future C2 capabilities, but to reflect on its role in the Marine Corps of the future. As stated by LtGen Van Riper, "Warfare is more than systems; it is fundamentally and ineluctably an interactive contest of human wills. Information superiority, as an enabling element in a command and control system that includes the appropriate doctrine and professional education, is vital. But information superiority in and of itself will not win any wars".
COMMAND AND CONTROL CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PEOPLE
Of the four C2 elements (people, doctrine, training, and HW/SW/ facilities) the people element is upper most. The Corps' C2 system must be designed and constructed foremost with this element in mind. Specially selected and trained Marines (those with the aptitude and interest) will have to be designated to operate the new system. These people will have to be capable of designing, establishing, and operating the C2 system for an infinite variety of operational configurations.
Challenges
Future C2 requirements will be much more demanding on the "people" element of the C2 system equation. It is a fallacy to believe that current information systems management and communications personnel will have the available time or training to plan, set up, and operate future C2 systems. The Corps is half way to its answer in this "the people element" of the C2 Marines, officer and enlisted, of the MACG are trained in air C2 and conduct those type operations on a daily basis.
The Marine GCE has its own C2 system. However, that system is not organized in a manner similar to that of the ACE. The GCE has no command similar to the MACG of the ACE that functions solely to provide personnel, equipment, and a command structure to support the C2 system. Even though, the mission and therefore the C2 requirements of the GCE and ACE are very different, it is time for the GCE to consider the ACE C2 system model.
Another difference in the GCE and the ACE is that the GCE does not formally train, by military occupational specialty (MOS), Marines to plan, coordinate, and operate its C2 system as does the ACE. The GCE assigns secondary duties to Marines from within its own commands for this purpose. The architectural design and operation of a C2 system is a complex field of studythat needs the attention of full time and well trained Marines.
The demanding OMFTS environment and the technology of tomorrow's C2 system demands that a new look be taken at how the Corps designates MOSs for the people of its C2 system.
The cost to the Corps for GCE full time C2 personnel will be: people, time, and dollars. Overall, the personnel cost of a GCE C2 MOS will be slight. Consolidation of GCE and ACE C2 personnel made possible by common HW/SW, and IT integration will negate current personnel duplication. Consolidation of GCE and ACE C2 personnel will bring an efficiency to the C2 personnel issue that will result in a decrease in C2 trained Marines the is taken now in refining the Corps' C2 organization, future costly restarts can be avoided.
Recommendations
Change to the "people" element of the Corps' C2 system is recommended in three areas: 1) establishment of a C2 MOS for officer and enlisted Marines, 2) the dissolution of the distinction that exists between GCE and ACE C2 personnel, and 3)
refine the organization of the people of the C2 system into a more "flattened" vice "deep" organizational structure.
First is the need for the establishment of a C2 MOS for
Marines that are responsible for the design, establishment, and operation of the future C2 system. This program should start now. The future C2 system will have great potential; it will be capable of supporting the commander with C2 that far exceeds today's standards. Currently the GCE tasks information systems and communications personnel with C2 responsibilities as an additional duty, resulting in inefficiency. OMFTS depends on a C2 system that incorporates the best that information technology can provide, the Corps must realize its need for C2 specialists trained in the capabilities of the latest IT.
Next, is the need to break down the barriers that exist between the GCE and ACE C2 communities. Standardization of computer HW/SW will allow integration of Marine as well as DoD information systems, bringing common C2 systems to both the GCE and ACE. A common set of HW/SW that differs only in the functions, programmed by the operator, will allow for a common training base that is not possible today. A single pool of C2
MOS trained Marines will be all that is needed to operate either GCE or ACE C2 systems. is easily defeated because his ability to fight as a force has been eliminated. 13 As Sun Tzu said, "Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strengths and strikes weakness" . The commander issues broad guidance rather than detailed directions. 18 Mission C2 is dependent on: highly trained personnel, initiative at lower echelons, and the commander's ability to establish a common vision through his stated intent.
It should be noted that the Corps' C2 doctrine does not propose mission type C2 for all cases, but does emphasize mission C2 when the situation allows.
The function of command, as described by Martin Van Creveld in his book Command in War, can be carried out by one or any combination of the three methods. Two have been discussed, the planning method and mission C2. The third method, direction C2
focuses on the commander's attempt to direct all the forces all the time. The U.S. Army's concept for its "Army After Next" relies heavily on the direction method of C2. This method relies on battlefield information dominance. The Army foresees information dominance as allowing the commander to apply discrete parts of his force in a single simultaneous act of overwhelming fire and maneuver. 19 The commander who is able to observe every enemy movement is able to divide his forces and position each precisely enough to control and dominate the enemy.
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Obviously, the Army is depending a great deal on IT as the enabler of its future force.
Recommendations
The Marine Corps must pursue the mission method of C2 for most of its operations. There will be missions where direct or planning C2 or a combination of the three is more appropriate.
The Corps has taken the first step toward its future C2 system with a doctrinal change in command philosophy that emphasizes mission C2. However, the direct method of C2 deserves more consideration by the Corps than it receives. Future IT advancements will enable the direct C2 method to be of more benefit than the Corps seems to be anticipating.
IT is rapidly changing our world, it is important that we use that technology to our greatest advantage. The future will never bring us the information capabilities that will enable a commander to have the situational awareness required to direct all of his forces all the time. However, the near future will see IT advancements that will greatly improve the direct method of C2. The Corps would do well to take a much stronger stance in incorporating the direct method of C2 along with its position on mission C2.
TRAINING
As the Corps' C2 doctrine changes, so must its training. Finally, the Corps must recognize and train their C2 specialists as they do any other occupational specialty (e.g.
infantry, artillery, etc) . C2 will be taking an even more prominent position on future battlefields, maneuver warfare demands it and IT allows for it. This subject has been discussed in the people section of this paper, but it also falls in the training element on the C2 system. The subject of recognizing and training the Corps' C2 people as a team may well be one of the most important issues facing the future C2 system of the Marine Corps.
HARDWARE. SOFTWARE. AND FACILITIES
HW/SW advancements will enhance the planning and conduct of operations, reducing time lines from days to hours.
Geographically distant commanders will be able to collaborate via video teleconferencing and have access to the latest information and automated planning tools. Video teleconferencing and e-mail will replace the automated digital information network. Leaders throughout the chain of command will have easier and quicker access to mission-critical intelligence, logistics, and weather information, enhancing the decision making process. 23 Military engagements are marked by uncertainty and quick decision-to-action cycles. This all goes back to the previously discussed OODA loop. Information on which to make decisions will never be as complete as the commander desires, but the speed with which it can be gathered, processed, and acted on is the critical factor. HW/SW technology will allow the OODA loop to be reduced if all elements of the C2 system are supportive of each other. Law holds true to this day. 24 With an acquisition process that takes an average of twelve years to get a system from inception to the user, it is possible that the military will always be at least a decade behind current technology. 
CONCLUSION
The Marine Corps' future operational concept of OMFTS will be supported by a newly emerging C2 system that will revolutionize the Corps' operations. The new C2 system has the potential for being more than an important support system to the overall operational effort. It can become a force enabler that will allow the employment of military power as never before. The new C2 system will be challenged in its support of the OMFTS environment that includes: direct movement of forces from ship to objective, decentralized, fast tempo, flexible, and simultaneous engagements up to 350 kilometers inland. Never before has the Corps asked for, nor depended so heavily on its C2 system. The
Corps is dependent on this system to enable its OMFTS operating concept of the future.
As the new system is developed it is vital to realize that C2 truly is a system of interdependent elements. The elements can be likened to a mathematical problem whereby an error in adding individual elements will result in an incorrect final product. The C2 equation is: people + doctrine + training + HW/SW and facilities = C2 system.
The unique element of the C2 system is and always will be the "people" element. The greatest care must be taken with this element of the system as C2 advances into the future. The Corps would do well to rethink how it uses and organizes the people that make up the foundation of its C2 system. Newly emerging common HW/SW will allow the Corps' two C2 communities that support the GCE and ACE to be combined into a single community supporting the Corps as a whole. It is also important that an MOS for C2 personnel be developed.
Doctrine is the element in the C2 system that establishes over-arching principles, it is the map to the C2 terrain. A newly published doctrine establishes the basic direction the C2 program will take. The recently released C2 manual, MCDP 6, presents a bold shift in doctrine. The mission method of C2 has become the prescribed standard, a far more flexible and useful doctrine in the emerging OMFTS environment.
The training element of the C2 system will be a real challenge to the Corps as they prepare for the future. C2 is all about. Care must be taken not to become overly dependent on IT, for it will never replace battlefield confrontation.
The IT, that makes our HW/SW advancements possible, is moving forward at such a rate that it will be difficult to staynear the forward edge of current technology. Initiatives are proceeding that will streamline the acquisition process and get weapon and HW/SW systems to the user in a more timely manner.
The difficulties of maintaining currency in IT may well be the most challenging aspect of the Corps' new C2 system. WORD COUNT 5914
